"Twenty-Eight Articles": Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency

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"28 Articles" originally came to *Military Review* as a submission for the Combined Arms Center Commanding General's Special Topics Writing Competition ("Countering Insurgency"). Pressed to publish the piece immediately because it could help Soldiers in the field, LTC Kilcullen graciously agreed and pulled his essay from the writing contest. It would certainly have been a strong contender for a prize.

Your company has just been warned about possible deployment for counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence, and Robert Thompson. You have studied FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, and now understand the history, philosophy, and theory of counterinsurgency.[1] You have watched *Black Hawk Down* and *The Battle of Algiers*, and you know this will be the most difficult challenge of your life.[2]

But what does all that theory mean, at the company level? How do the principles translate into action at night, with the GPS (global positioning system) down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don't understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does counterinsurgency actually happen?

There are no universal answers, and insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents you will ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect. But be comforted: You are not the first to feel this way. There are tactical fundamentals you can apply to link the theory with the techniques and procedures you already know.

What is Counterinsurgency?

If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: Counterinsurgency is a competition with the insurgent for the right to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything with less strength than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people, and societal disruption that fuel and perpetuate the insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For your side to win, the people don't have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security. In this battlefield, popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks.

Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience, the distilled essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.

Preparation

Time is short during predeployment, but you will never have more time to think than you have now. Now is your chance to prepare yourself and your command.

1. Know your turf. Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion, and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district. If you don't know precisely where you will be operating, study the general area. Read the map like a book: Study it every night before sleep and redraw it from memory every morning until you understand its patterns intuitively. Develop a mental model of your area, a framework in which to fit every new piece of knowledge you acquire. Study handover notes from predecessors; better still, get in touch with the unit in theater and pick their leaders' brains. In an ideal world, intelligence officers and area experts would brief you; however, this rarely happens, and even if it does, there is no substitute for personal mastery. Understand the broader area of influence, which can be a wide area, particularly when insurgents draw on global grievances. Share out aspects of the operational area among platoon leaders and noncommissioned officers; have each individual develop a personal specialization and brief the others. Neglect this knowledge, and it will kill you.

2. Diagnose the problem. Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose the problem. Who are the insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick? Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between each side to mobilize the population in support of its agenda. So you must understand what motivates the people and how to mobilize them. You need to know why and how the insurgents are getting followers. This means you need to know your real enemy, not a cardboard cut-out. The enemy is adaptive, resourceful, and probably grew up in the region where you will be operating. The locals have known him since he was a boy; how long have they known you? Your worst opponent is not the psychopathic terrorist of Hollywood; it is the charismatic follow-me warrior who would make your best platoon leader. His followers are not misled or naïve; much of his success may be due to bad government policies or security forces that alienate the population. Work

this problem collectively with your platoon and squad leaders. Discuss ideas, explore the problem, understand what you are facing, and seek a consensus. If this sounds unmilitary, get over it. Once you are in theater, situations will arise too quickly for orders or even commander's intent. Corporals and privates will have to make snap judgments with strategic impact. The only way to help them is to give them a shared understanding, then trust them to think for themselves on the day.

3. Organize for intelligence. In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary. Your operations will be intelligence-driven, but intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not as a product prepared and served up by higher headquarters. So you must organize for intelligence. You will need a company S2 and an intelligence section (including analysts). You might need platoon S2s and S3s, and you will need a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) element. You will not have enough linguists—you never do—but carefully consider where best to use them. Linguists are a battle-winning asset, but like any other scarce resource, you must have a prioritized "bump plan" in case you lose them. Often during predeployment the best use of linguists is to train your command in basic language. You will probably not get augmentation for all this, but you must still do it. Put the smartest soldiers in the S2 section and the R&S squad. You will have one less rifle squad, but the intelligence section will pay for itself in lives and effort saved.

4. Organize for interagency operations. Almost everything in counterinsurgency is interagency. And everything important, from policing to intelligence to civil-military operations to trash collection, will involve your company working with civilian actors and local indigenous partners you cannot control, but whose success is essential for yours. Train the company in interagency operations: Get a briefing from the U.S. Department of State, aid agencies, and the local police or fire brigade. Train point-men in each squad to deal with the interagency people. Realize that civilians find rifles, helmets, and body armor intimidating. Learn how not to scare them. Ask others who come from that country or culture about your ideas. See it through the eyes of a civilian who knows nothing about the military. How would you react if foreigners came to your neighborhood and conducted the operations you planned? What if somebody came to your mother's house and did that? Most importantly, know that your operations will create a temporary breathing space, but long-term development and stabilization by civilian agencies will ultimately win the war.

5. Travel light and harden your combat service support (CSS). You will be weighed down with body armor, rations, extra ammunition, communications gear, and a thousand other things. The enemy will carry a rifle or rocket-propelled grenade launcher, a shemagh (head scarf), and a water bottle if he is lucky. Unless you ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a culture of speed and mobility, the insurgents will consistently out-run and outmaneuver you. But in lightening your load, make sure you can always reach back to call for firepower or heavy support if needed. Also, remember to harden your CSS. The enemy will attack your weakest points. Most attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, outside preplanned combat actions like the two battles of Falluja or Operation Iron Horse, were against CSS installations and convoys. You do the math. Ensure your CSS assets are hardened, have communications, and are trained in combat operations. They may do more fighting than your rifle squads.

6. Find a political/cultural adviser. In a force optimized for counterinsurgency, you might receive a political-cultural adviser at company level, a diplomat or military foreign area officer able to speak the language and navigate the intricacies of local politics. Back on planet Earth, the corps and division commander will get a political advisor; you will not, so you must improvise. Find a POLAD (political-cultural adviser) from among your people—perhaps an officer, perhaps not (see article 8). Someone with people skills and a feel for the environment will do better than a political-science graduate. Don't try to be your own cultural adviser: You must be fully aware of the political and cultural dimension, but this is a different task. Also, don't give one of your intelligence people this role. They can help, but their task is to understand the environment. The POLAD's job is to help shape it.

7. Train the squad leaders—then trust them. Counterinsurgency is a squad and platoon leader's war, and often a private soldier's war. Battles are won or lost in moments: Whoever can bring combat power to bear in seconds, on a street corner, will win. The commander on the spot controls the fight. You must train the squad leaders to act intelligently and independently without orders. If your squad leaders are competent, you can get away with average company or platoon staffs. The reverse is not the case. Training should focus on basic skills: marksmanship, patrolling, security on the move and at the halt, and basic drills. When in doubt, spend less time on company and platoon training, and more time on squads. Ruthlessly replace leaders who do not make the grade. But once people are trained and you have a shared operational diagnosis, you must trust them. We talk about this, but few company or platoon leaders really trust their people. In counterinsurgency, you have no choice.

8. Rank is nothing; talent is everything. Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many people don't understand the concept, and some can't execute it. It is difficult, and in a conventional force only a few people will master it. Anyone can learn the basics, but a few naturals do exist. Learn how to spot these people, and put them into positions where they can make a difference. Rank matters far less than talent—a few good men led by a smart junior noncommissioned officer can succeed in counterinsurgency, where hundreds of well-armed soldiers under a mediocre senior officer will fail.

9. Have a game plan. The final preparation task is to develop a game plan, a mental picture of how you see the operation developing. You will be tempted to try and do this too early. But wait, as your knowledge improves, you will get a better idea of what needs to be done and a fuller understanding of your own limitations. Like any plan, this plan will change once you hit the ground, and it may need to be scrapped if there is

a major shift in the environment. But you still need a plan, and the process of planning will give you a simple, robust idea of what to achieve, even if the methods change. This is sometimes called "operational design." One approach is to identify basic stages in your operation, for example "establish dominance, build local networks, marginalize the enemy." Make sure you can easily transition between phases, forward and backward, in case of setbacks. Just as the insurgent can adapt his activity to yours, so you must have a simple enough plan to survive setbacks without collapsing. This plan is the solution that matches the shared diagnosis you developed earlier. It must be simple, and known to everyone.

The Golden Hour

You have deployed, completed reception and staging, and (if you are lucky) attended the in-country counterinsurgency school. Now it is time to enter your sector and start your tour. This is the golden hour. Mistakes made now will haunt you for the rest of your tour, while early successes will set the tone for victory. You will look back on your early actions and cringe at your clumsiness. So be it. But you must act.

10. Be there. The most fundamental rule of counterinsurgency is to be there. You can almost never outrun the enemy. If you are not present when an incident happens, there is usually little you can do about it. So your first order of business is to establish presence. If you can't do this throughout your sector, then do it wherever you can. This demands a residential approach: living in your sector, in close proximity to the population rather than raiding into the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling—all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people they can trust and do business with, not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy, day-tripping like a tourist in hell, degrades situational awareness, makes you a target, and is ultimately more dangerous.

11. Avoid knee-jerk responses to first impressions. Don't act rashly; get the facts first. The violence you see may be part of the insurgent strategy; it may be various interest groups fighting it out with each other or settling personal vendettas. Normality in Kandahar is not the same as in Seattle—you need time to learn what normality looks like. The insurgent commander wants to goad you into lashing out at the population or making a mistake. Unless you happen to be on the spot when an incident occurs, you will have only second-hand reports and may misunderstand the local context or interpretation. This fragmentation and "disaggregation" of the battlefield, particularly in urban areas, means that first impressions are often highly misleading. Of course, you can't avoid making judgments. But if possible, check them with an older hand or a trusted local. If you can, keep one or two officers from your predecessor unit for the first part of the tour. Try to avoid a rush to judgment.

12. Prepare for handover from day one. Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency on your watch. Your tour will end, and your successors will need your corporate knowledge. Start handover folders, in every platoon and specialist squad, from day one. Ideally, you would have inherited these from your predecessors, but if not you must start them. The folders should include lessons learned, details about the population, village and patrol reports, updated maps, and photographs—anything that will help newcomers master the environment. Computerized databases are fine, but keep good back-ups and ensure you have hard copy of key artifacts and documents. This is boring and tedious, but essential. Over time, you will create a corporate memory that keeps your people alive.

13. Build trusted networks. Once you have settled into your sector, your key task is to build trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase hearts and minds, which comprises two separate components. Hearts means persuading people their best interests are served by your success; minds means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has anything to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, if you successfully build networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemy's networks, bringing him out into the open to fight you, and letting you seize the initiative. These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other friendly or neutral nonstate actors in your area, and the media. Conduct village and neighborhood surveys to identify needs in the community, then follow through to meet them. Build common interests and mobilize popular support. This is your true main effort; everything else is secondary. Actions that help build trusted networks serve your cause. Actions—even killing high-profile targets that undermine trust or disrupt your networks—help the enemy.

14. Start easy. If you were trained in maneuver warfare you know about surfaces and gaps. This applies to counterinsurgency as much as any other form of maneuver. Don't try to crack the hardest nut first—don't go straight for the main insurgent stronghold, try to provoke a decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that support the insurgents. Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outwards. Do this by extending your influence through the locals' own networks. Go with, not against, the grain of local society. First win the confidence of a few villages and see who they trade, intermarry, or do business with. Now win these people over. Soon enough the showdown with the insurgents will come. But now you have local allies, a mobilized population, and a trusted network at your back. Do it the other way around and no one will mourn your failure.

15. Seek early victories. In this early phase, your aim is to stamp your dominance in your sector. Do this by seeking an early victory. This will probably not translate into a combat victory over the enemy. Looking for such a victory can be overly aggressive and create collateral damage—especially since you really do not yet understand your sector. Also, such a combat victory depends on the enemy being stupid enough to present you with a clear-cut target, which is a rare windfall in counterinsurgency. Instead, you may achieve a victory by resolving long-standing issues your predecessors have failed to address, or by co-opting a key local leader who has resisted cooperation with our forces. Like any other form of armed

propaganda, achieving even a small victory early in the tour sets the tone for what comes later and helps seize the initiative, which you have probably lost due to the inevitable hiatus entailed by the handover-takeover with your predecessor.

16. Practice deterrent patrolling. Establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy from attacking you. Often our patrolling approach seems designed to provoke, then defeat, enemy attacks. This is counterproductive; it leads to a raiding, day-tripping mindset or, worse, a bunker mentality. Instead, practice deterrent patrolling. There are many methods for this, including multiple patrolling in which you flood an area with numerous small patrols working together. Each is too small to be a worthwhile target, and the insurgents never know where all the patrols are—making an attack on any one patrol extremely risky. Other methods include so-called blue-green patrolling, where you mount daylight, overt humanitarian patrols, which go covert at night and hunt specific targets. Again, the aim is to keep the enemy off balance, and the population reassured through constant and unpredictable activity which, over time, deters attacks and creates a more permissive environment. A reasonable rule of thumb is that one- to two-thirds of your force should be on patrol at any time, day or night.

17. Be prepared for setbacks. Setbacks are normal in counterinsurgency, as in every other form of war. You will make mistakes, lose people, or occasionally kill or detain the wrong person. You may fail in building or expanding networks. If this happens, don't lose heart, simply drop back to the previous phase of your game plan and recover your balance. It is normal in company counterinsurgency operations for some platoons to be doing well while others do badly. This is not necessarily evidence of failure. Give local commanders the freedom to adjust their posture to local conditions. This creates elasticity that helps you survive setbacks.

18. Remember the global audience. One of the biggest differences between the counterinsurgencies our fathers fought and those we face today is the omnipresence of globalized media. Most houses in Iraq have one or more satellite dishes. Web bloggers; print, radio, and television reporters; and others are monitoring and reporting your every move. When the insurgents ambush your patrols or set off a car bomb, they do so not to destroy one more track, but because they want graphic images of a burning vehicle and dead bodies for the evening news. Beware of the scripted enemy who plays to a global audience and seeks to defeat you in the court of global public opinion. You counter this by training people to always bear in mind the global audience, to assume that everything they say or do will be publicized, and to befriend the media. Get the press on-side—help them get their story, and trade information with them. Good relationships with nonembedded media, especially indigenous media, dramatically increase your situational awareness and help get your message across to the global and local audience.

19. Engage the women, beware of the children. Most insurgent fighters are men. But in traditional societies, women are hugely influential in forming the social networks that insurgents use for support. Co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually undermine the insurgents. You need your own female counterinsurgents, including interagency people, to do this effectively. Win the women, and you own the family unit. Own the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population. Conversely, though, stop your people from fraternizing with the local children. Your troops are homesick; they want to drop their guard with the kids, but children are sharp-eyed, lacking in empathy, and willing to commit atrocities their elders would shrink from. The insurgents are watching: They will notice a growing friendship between one of your people and a local child, and either harm the child as punishment, or use them against you. Similarly, stop people throwing candies or presents to children. It attracts them to our vehicles, creates crowds the enemy can exploit, and leads to children being run over. Harden your heart and keep the children at arm's length.

20. Take stock regularly. You probably already know that a body count tells you little, because you usually can't know how many insurgents there were to start with, how many moved into the area, how many transferred from supporter to combatant status, or how many new fighters the conflict has created. But you still need to develop metrics early in the tour and refine them as the operation progresses. They should cover a range of social, informational, military, and economic issues. Use metrics intelligently to form an overall impression of progress—not in a mechanistic traffic-light fashion. Typical metrics include percentage of engagements initiated by our forces versus those initiated by insurgents; longevity of friendly local leaders in positions of authority; number and quality of tip-offs on insurgent activity that originate spontaneously from the population; and economic activity at markets and shops. These mean virtually nothing as a snapshot; it is trends over time that help you track progress in your sector.

Groundhog Day

Now you are in "steady state." You are established in your sector, and people are settling into that "groundhog day" mentality that hits every unit at some stage during every tour. It will probably take you at least the first third of your tour to become effective in your new environment, if not longer. Then in the last period you will struggle against the short-timer mentality. So this middle part of the tour is the most productive—but keeping the flame alive, and bringing the local population along with you, takes immense leadership.

21. Exploit a "single narrative." Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized. In most societies there are opinion makers—local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence, including the pernicious influence of the insurgents, often takes the form of a "single narrative": a simple, unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes people's experience and provides a framework for understanding events. Nationalist and ethnic historical myths, or sectarian creeds, provide such a narrative. The Iraqi insurgents have one, as do Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. To undercut

their influence you must exploit an alternative narrative, or better yet, tap into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents. This narrative is often worked out for you by higher headquarters—but only you have the detailed knowledge to tailor the narrative to local conditions and generate leverage from it. For example, you might use a nationalist narrative to marginalize foreign fighters in your area or a narrative of national redemption to undermine former regime elements that have been terrorizing the population. At the company level, you do this in baby steps by getting to know local opinion-makers, winning their trust, learning what motivates them, and building on this to find a single narrative that emphasizes the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate success. This is art, not science.

22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not the Americans. By this stage, you will be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them and building indigenous capability. The natural tendency is to build forces in the U.S. image, with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. This is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy's capabilities and seek to supplant the insurgent's role. This does not mean they should be irregular in the sense of being brutal or outside proper control. Rather, they should move, equip, and organize like the insurgents, but have access to your support and be under the firm control of their parent societies. Combined with a mobilized population and trusted networks, this allows local forces to hard-wire the enemy out of the environment, under top-cover from you. At the company level, this means that raising, training, and employing local indigenous auxiliary forces (police and military) are valid tasks. This requires high-level clearance, of course, but if support is given, you should establish a company training cell. Platoons should aim to train one local squad, then use that squad as a nucleus for a partner platoon. Company headquarters should train an indigenous leadership team. This mirrors the growth process of other trusted networks and tends to emerge naturally as you win local allies who want to take up arms in their own defense.

23. Practice armed civil affairs. Counterinsurgency is armed social work, an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought. It is how you restructure the environment to displace the enemy from it. In your company sector, civil affairs must focus on meeting basic needs first, then progress up Maslow's hierarchy as each successive need is met. You need intimate cooperation with interagency partners here—national, international, and local. You will not be able to control these partners—many NGOs, for example, do not want to be too closely associated with you because they need to preserve their perceived neutrality. Instead, you need to work on a shared diagnosis of the problem, building a consensus that helps you self-synchronize. Your role is to provide protection, identify needs, facilitate civil affairs, and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the population. Thus, there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency. Every time you help someone, you hurt someone else—not least the insurgents—so civil and humanitarian assistance personnel will be targeted. Protecting them is a matter not only of close-in defense, but also of creating a permissive operating environment by co-opting the beneficiaries of aid (local communities and leaders) to help you help them.

24. Small is beautiful. Another natural tendency is to go for large-scale, mass programs. In particular, we have a tendency to template ideas that succeed in one area and transplant them into another, and we tend to take small programs that work and try to replicate them on a larger scale. Again, this is usually a mistake: Often programs succeed because of specific local conditions of which we are unaware, or because their very smallness kept them below the enemy's radar and helped them flourish unmolested. At the company level, programs that succeed in one district often also succeed in another (because the overall company sector is small), but small-scale projects rarely proceed smoothly into large programs. Keep programs small; this makes them cheap, sustainable, low-key, and (importantly) recoverable if they fail. You can add new programs—also small, cheap and tailored to local conditions—as the situation allows.

25. Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces. At this stage, if things are proceeding well, the insurgents will go over to the offensive. Yes, the offensive, because you have created a situation so dangerous to the insurgents (by threatening to displace them from the environment) that they have to attack you and the population to get back into the game. Thus it is normal, even in the most successful operations, to have spikes of offensive insurgent activity late in the campaign. This does not necessarily mean you have done something wrong (though it may, it depends on whether you have successfully mobilized the population). At this point the tendency is to go for the jugular and seek to destroy the enemy's forces in open battle. This is rarely the best choice at company level, because provoking major combat usually plays into the enemy's hands by undermining the population's confidence. Instead, attack the enemy's strategy. If he is seeking to recapture the allegiance of a segment of the local population, then co-opt them against him. If he is trying to provoke a sectarian conflict, go over to peace-enforcement mode. The permutations are endless, but the principle is the same: Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces.

26. Build your own solution—only attack the enemy when he gets in the way. Try not to be distracted or forced into a series of reactive moves by a desire to kill or capture the insurgents. Your aim should be to implement your own solution, the game plan you developed early in the campaign and then refined through interaction with local partners. Your approach must be environment-centric (based on dominating the whole district and implementing a solution to its systemic problems) rather than enemy-centric. This means that particularly late in the campaign you may need to learn to negotiate with the enemy. Members of the population that supports you also know the enemy's leaders. They may have grown up together in the small district that is now your company sector, and valid negotiating partners

sometimes emerge as the campaign progresses. Again, you need close interagency relationships to exploit opportunities to co-opt segments of the enemy. This helps you wind down the insurgency without alienating potential local allies who have relatives or friends in the insurgent movement. At this stage, a defection is better than a surrender, a surrender is better than a capture, and a capture is better than a kill.

Getting Short

Time is short, and the tour is drawing to a close. The key problem now is keeping your people focused, maintaining the rage on all the multifarious programs, projects, and operations that you have started, and preventing your people from dropping their guard. In this final phase, the previous articles still stand, but there is an important new one.

27. Keep your extraction plan secret. The temptation to talk about home becomes almost unbearable toward the end of a tour. The locals know you are leaving, and probably have a better idea than you of the generic extraction plan. Remember, they have seen units come and go. But you must protect the specific details of the extraction plan, or the enemy will use this as an opportunity to score a high-profile hit, recapture the population's allegiance by scare tactics that convince them they will not be protected once you leave, or persuade them that your successor unit will be oppressive or incompetent. Keep the details secret within a tightly controlled compartment in your headquarters.

Four "What Ifs"

The articles above describe what should happen, but we all know that things go wrong. Here are some what ifs to consider:

- What if you get moved to a different area? You prepared for ar-Ramadi and studied Dulaim tribal structures and Sunni beliefs. Now you are going to Najaf and will be surrounded by al-Hassani tribes and Shi'a communities. But that work was not wasted. In mastering your first area, you learned techniques you can apply: how to "case" an operational area and how to decide what matters in the local societal structure. Do the same again, and this time the process is easier and faster, since you have an existing mental structure and can focus on what is different. The same applies if you get moved frequently within a battalion or brigade area.
- What if higher headquarters doesn't "get" counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is telling you the mission is to "kill terrorists," or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a base-camp mentality. They just don't seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not uncommon, since company-grade officers today often have more combat experience than senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage "first do no harm." Over time, you will find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations or activities—they own the indirect fires.
- What if you have no resources? You have no linguists, the aid agencies have no money for projects in your area, and you have a low priority for civil affairs. You can still get things done, but you need to focus on self-reliance: Keep things small and sustainable and ruthlessly prioritize effort. The local population are your allies in this: They know what matters to them more than you do. Be honest with them; discuss possible projects and options with community leaders; get them to choose what their priorities are. Often they will find the translators, building supplies, or expertise that you need, and will only expect your support and protection in making their projects work. And the process of negotiation and consultation will help mobilize their support and strengthen their social cohesion. If you set your sights on what is achievable, the situation can still work.
- What if the theater situation shifts under your feet? It is your worst nightmare: Everything has gone well in your sector, but the whole theater situation has changed and invalidates your efforts. Think of the first battle of Falluja, the Askariya shrine bombing, or the Sadr uprising. What do you do? Here is where having a flexible, adaptive game plan comes in. Just as the insurgents drop down to a lower posture when things go wrong, now is the time for you to drop back a stage, consolidate, regain your balance, and prepare to expand again when the situation allows. But see article 28: If you cede the initiative, you must regain it as soon as the situation allows, or you will eventually lose.

This, then, is the tribal wisdom, the folklore that those who went before you have learned. Like any folklore it needs interpretation and contains seemingly contradictory advice. Over time, as you apply unremitting intellectual effort to study your sector, you will learn to apply these ideas in your own way and will add to this store of wisdom from your own observations and experience. So only one article remains, and if you remember nothing else, remember this:

28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative. In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy, even if you are killing or capturing him in large numbers, then he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose. In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly, and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do not be drawn into purely reactive operations: Focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game plan, and fight the enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and keeps the initiative. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006).

2. *Black Hawk Down* (Los Angeles, CA: Scott Free Productions, 2002); *The Battle of Algiers* (Casbah Film and Igor Film, 1967).

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Sharp Pens Sharpen Swords: Writing for Professional Publications

Colonel John M. Collins
U.S. Army, Retired

It is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness.

—Chinese Proverb

Most modern writers prefer computers to pens, 21st-century swords are mainly ceremonial, and Thomas Edison's incandescent bulbs long ago replaced candles, but the title of this article and the quotation remain figuratively correct because intellectual pathfinders who shed light on politico-military problems and then suggest solutions perform invaluable services. The message to readers and writers is: It is never too early or too late to make your mark. I have selected the following 15 publications from nearly 100 outlets because they offer aspiring authors a rich menu of publication options.

Trailblazers

The *Infantry Journal*, activated in 1904, was a typical trailblazer.[1] Charter members who gave that brainchild an auspicious start included two famous flag officers and two precocious second lieutenants. Major General Arthur MacArthur, Doug's daddy, wore a Medal of Honor; Major General Tasker Bliss culminated his career as the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) (1917-1918). Second Lieutenant George Catlett Marshall, who became CSA shortly before World War II, retired with five stars and later served as Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State; four-star General Walter Krueger, commissioned from the ranks, commanded the Sixth U.S. Army during all of its campaigns in the Southwest Pacific.

A 679-page anthology called *The Infantry Journal Reader*, published in 1943, reprinted 178 handpicked articles.[2] The list of authors includes many names that were little known in the early 1930s but now are illustrious: German Panzer leader General Heinz Guderian; U.S. Army General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, who headed the China-Burma-India theater during World War II; Flying Tigers leader "Colonel" Claire Chennault; Ole "Blood and Guts" General George Patton; General William Lee (the father of U.S. airborne forces); and British Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, an oft-quoted strategist. Harold Lamb, who later wrote 14 highly respected military histories, and Robert Strausz-Hupé, who founded the Foreign Policy Research Institute, are representive of standout civilians.

Forty other contributors to *The Infantry Journal Reader* might have become famous, but nobody ever will know because they hid behind ludicrous pseudonyms like Whitenred, Blackanblue, Stonecold, Tentage, Tenderhide, Trenchcoat, Chevron, Hungry, and Heelclicker, despite assurances that "the politics of an author makes no difference. Democrats, Republicans; New Deal, Old Deal; Right, Left, middle; so long as he has something to say about fighting war that makes sense, his article is printed."[3]

Current Torchbearers

The 15 contemporary U.S. torchbearers selected for comparison vary considerably with regard to frequency of publication, clientele, and content. Monthly magazines, for example, are better suited for hot topics than quarterlies; outlets that reach mainly parochial audiences contrast sharply with cosmopolitan competitors; while those that cast the widest nets potentially influence the most readers. Not all, for example, reach officials in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Department of State, national security agencies, academia, think tanks, research institutes, businesses, the news media, U.S. service schools, selected libraries, allied embassies, and military establishments abroad. The number of hard-copy subscribers is less important than in the fairly recent past because most on-line editions are free.

Air & Space Power Journal. *Air & Space Power Journal* is an official publication of the U.S. Air Force, but opinions expressed therein need not reflect prevailing policies. On the contrary, its editor seeks innovative ideas about aerospace doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. Assorted selections during 2005 reviewed Red Flag training exercises, aerial search and rescue operations, air base defense, and esoteric counterspace initiatives.

Armed Forces Journal. *Armed Forces Journal (AFJ),* a joint service monthly magazine that targets audiences throughout the U.S. military community, has reviewed and analyzed key defense issues for over 140 years. *AFJ* offers in-depth coverage of military technology, procurement, logistics, doctrine, strategy, and tactics. It also provides special coverage of special operations, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Army National Guard developments. Representative articles recently proceeded up the scale from smart artillery to big-ticket budget programs, occupation problems in Iraq, and space wargames.

Army. *Army* magazine, a monthly product of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), covers a spectrum of tactical, operational, strategic, and logistical landpower issues, with particular attention to U.S. Army activities and interests worldwide. Prominent displays in recent months included the new modular Army, future combat systems, disaster relief, Active and Reserve Component culture gaps, and Army recruiting crises. Presentations commonly include a block of articles that attack particular topics from different angles.

Foreign Affairs. The Council on Foreign Relations, which concentrates on U.S. foreign policy and international affairs, includes nearly all past and present presidents; secretaries of state, defense, treasury, and other senior U.S. Government officials; renowned scholars; and major leaders of business, media, human rights, and other nongovernmental groups. The Council publishes *Foreign Affairs,* a quarterly forum for new ideas, analyses, and debate. Foreign policy polls, and articles on pandemics, regime

changes, and how to win the war in Iraq have graced its pages during the last year.

Foreign Policy. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publishes *Foreign Policy,* a quarterly that offers informative, insightful, and lively discourse on the full range of topics related to U.S. foreign policy and national security as well as in-depth analyses of important international developments. Illustrative subjects include UN control of the Internet, a profile of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, nuclear proliferation, and energy interdependence.

Joint Force Quarterly. The National Defense University Press publishes *Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)* for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JFQ* features joint and combined education, training, and operations, plus national security policies and strategies, for use by top-flight DOD, interagency, and allied decisionmakers and their staffs. Other beneficiaries include politico-military planners and programmers at lower levels. *JFQ's* editor recently snapped up articles about international-interagency processes, multinational interoperability, transformation, and joint logistics.

Marine Corps Gazette. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Association's cornerstone publication is the monthly *Marine Corps Gazette,* which keeps readers well informed concerning the USMC's history, policies, current operations, plans, and programs. Esprit is a perennial topic. Themes in a recent issue included individual and small-unit discipline, protecting infrastructure, measuring success in counterinsurgency, information management from the bottom, air/naval gunfire liaison companies, and recommended readings.

Military Review. *Military Review*, ensconced at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as a subsidiary of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, is a forum for original thought on the art and science of land warfare at tactical and operational levels. Readers in more than 100 countries receive bimonthly issues in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and Arabic. Samplings during 2005 disclosed bits about brigade combat teams, Iraqi security forces, improvised explosive devises, and cultural-knowledge needs.

Naval War College Review. The *Naval War College Review* discusses public policy matters of interest to maritime services. Articles satisfy two essential criteria: They support academic and professional activities of the Naval War College, and they appeal to a wide readership. Topics range from strategy and operations through international law, defense economics, and regional security studies to civil-military relations, wargaming, and military ethics, with particular attention to influences on maritime security.

Orbis. In 1957, the Foreign Policy Research Institute founded *Orbis*, a quarterly journal of world affairs, which provides an outlet for policymakers, scholars, and private citizens who seek informative, insightful, lively discourse regarding the full range of U.S. foreign policy and national security topics as well as in-depth analysis of other important international developments. The CIA's culture, the effect immigration has on national security, the United States' ability to transplant democracy and its relationships with the European Union are representative subjects.

Parameters. *Parameters*, devoted to strategically significant national defense issues, emanates from the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. It emphasizes the art and science of land warfare; joint and combined matters; military strategy; military leadership and management; and military history, ethics, and other topics of current interest to the U.S. Army, DOD, and students of such subjects everywhere. Recent topics included commentaries on the events in Afghanistan after 4 years, the treatment of illegal combatants, intelligence reform, and controversies concerning the news media.

Proceedings. *Proceedings* magazine has been the U.S. Naval Institute's flagship publication since 1874. Its editor increasingly solicits articles that highlight the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force, but it still concentrates on issues that primarily affect the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S.-flagged Merchant Marine. Each monthly issue addresses current issues and historical perspectives from strategic, operational, and tactical angles. The following four items are illustrative: USCG homeland security roles, high-speed sealift, naval special operations, and naval education.

Sea Power. The Navy League circulates *Sea Power* magazine each month to educate sea services, the American people, their elected representatives, and industry regarding the need for robust naval and maritime forces. *Sea Power* tracks naval policy and political developments and documents key developments in major ship, naval aircraft, weapons, and doctrinal programs. Short-range missile threats, the new Iraqi Navy, naval counterterrorism capabilities, and sea basing attracted recent attention.

Special Warfare. *Special Warfare* magazine, under the auspices of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, promotes the professional development of special operations forces (SOF) by critiquing established doctrine and advancing new ideas for consideration throughout the Army special operations community. All aspects of Special Forces, Rangers, civil affairs, psychological operations, and the Army's special operations aviation regiment are subject to scrutiny. Articles that publicize unclassified aspects of SOF activities in hotspots overseas are particularly popular.

The Washington Quarterly. The Center for Strategic and International Studies issues *The Washington Quarterly,* a journal of international affairs that analyzes global strategic changes and their public policy implications for subscribers in more than 50 countries. Typical topics include the U.S. role in the world, emerging great powers, missile defenses, counterterrorism, regional flashpoints, and the implications of global political change. Contributors reflect diverse political, regional, and professional perspectives.

Websites

- *Air & Space Power Journal,* published by the Airpower Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, is on-line at <www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apje.html>, accessed 14 April 2006.
- *Armed Forces Journal (AFJ),* published by Army Times Publishing Company, New York, is on-line at <www.armedforcesjournal.com/>, accessed 14 April 2006.
- *Army Magazine,* published by AUSA, Arlington, Virginia, is on-line at <www.ausa.org/armymagazine>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Foreign Affairs,* published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York and Washington, D.C., is on-line at <www.foreignaffairs.org/>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Foreign Policy,* published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., is on-line at <www.foreignpolicy.com>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Joint Forces Quarterly,* published for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., is on-line at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Marine Corps Gazette,* published by the Marine Corps Association, Quantico, Virginia, is on-line at <www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/gaz.html>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Military Review,* published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is on-line at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/index.asp>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Naval War College Review,* published by the Naval War College Press, Newport, Rhode Island, is on-line at <www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/about NWCR.htm>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Orbis,* published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is on-line at <www.fpri.org/orbis/>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Parameters,* published by the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, is on-line at <www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/parahome.htm>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Proceedings,* published by the U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, is on-line at <www.usni.org/proceedings/proceedings.html>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Sea Power Magazine,* published by the Navy League of the United States, Arlington, Virginia, is on-line at <www.navyleague.org/sea_power/>, accessed 14 April 2006.

● *Special Warfare* is published by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Articles should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare,* USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

● *Washington Quarterly,* published by the Center for Strategy and International Studies, Washington, D.C., is on-line at <www.twq.com/>, accessed 14 April 2006.

Principles of Outstanding Professional Writing

Every professional publication prefers its own writing style, but authors who honor the following tips generally produce the most attractive drafts for consideration anywhere.

Title. Pick a title that is descriptive and short. This first step is imperative, because it essentially determines what the document is all about.

Mission. Tack the writing mission on the wall and keep it constantly in sight. Disregard all tangential topics, no matter how interesting or important they might be.

Outline. Prepare an outline even for short papers, so all relevant subjects are displayed in a logical sequence. Begin with a skeleton outline, then add subtopics, and outline each of them. Revise the outline as you progress. (Outlines are a lot like contingency plans, which seldom are implemented the way their architects originally conceived them.)

Basic subdivisions. Professional books, magazine articles, substantial reports, and other official papers most often should comprise five parts, even if informally: ***background, purpose, scope, main body, and wrap-up.***

● Background information up front briefly explains why the subject is important.

● One or more sharply defined purposes identify central objectives.

● The scope tells readers what topics to expect and what not to expect.

● The main body, which discusses all pertinent points, establishes a solid foundation.

● Conclusions, culminating comments, recapitulation or whatever you care to call it leaves readers with the ultimate message. The wrap-up should never address topics not previously discussed.

Research Techniques

● Peruse a broad spectrum of opinion with an open mind. Never reach conclusions first and then prepare a paper to support them. You will often find that initial impressions were poorly founded and fallacious.

● Take nothing for granted. Challenge conventional wisdom to determine if it is sound, regardless of the source.

● Document important ideas with footnotes so readers can pursue selected topics in greater depth, if they desire.

Writing Techniques

● An introductory quotation that precedes paragraph 1 on page 1 of a relatively short document or that opens chapters of a longer one can establish themes, particularly if tied directly to the text.

● The lead sentence and paragraph should capture reader interest immediately. You might not get a second chance.

● Understatement is preferable to hyperbole. Never use a sledgehammer to drive a thumbtack.

● Precious ideas get lost if presentations are boring, so use a thesaurus to avoid undesirable repetition and use quotation books to add spice.

● Acknowledge opposing views and critique them. That way you answer questions before skeptics ask them.

● Use common terms so all readers can continue without constant reference to a dictionary. Avoid unnecessary use of foreign words. Employ acronyms sparingly.

● Mix simple with complex sentences to build paragraphs that are neither staccato nor excessively long, so the document reads smoothly.

● Keep it simple so all readers can understand complex subjects. (When my son was 6 years old he had a book that basically explained Einstein's Theory of Relativity.)

● Be clear and concise, but never sacrifice clarity for brevity. Never use 10 words when 1 or 2 say the same thing equally well or better.

● Be precise. Pick every word carefully.

● Emphasize active voice. Open each sentence with a primary thought, then follow with appropriate modifiers (although, however, but, yet) as required.

● Never open sentences with a conjunction (and, but).

● Use topic headings as "road signs" so the writer as well as readers know at all times where they have been, where they are, and where they are headed.

Review Techniques

- Few writers produce perfect first drafts, so rewrite each paragraph until it is the best you can produce.
- Be your own sharpest critic. Read out loud what you wrote to see how it sounds.
- Solicit comments from knowledgeable peer reviewers. Pay attention if they disagree or do not understand, particularly if more than one reviewer finds similar faults. Otherwise, you unnecessarily risk public embarrassment after the document is published.
- Proof carefully.

Culminating Comments

Consider the bulleted topics above to be starting points. Add, subtract, and otherwise revise as you see fit until you possess writing tips that suit your particular style, and then use them as a checklist to improve future products.

Hop to it. Geriatric John Collins, halfway through his 8th decade, will be on the sidelines cheering. ***MR***

NOTES

1. For more information about *The Infantry Journal,* and its history, see on-line at <www.infantry.bookscans.com/infantry.htm>, accessed 17 April 2006.
2. Joseph I. Greene, *The Infantry Journal Reader* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1943).
3. Ibid.

Colonel John M. Collins, U.S. Army, Retired, has contributed articles to 13 of the 15 publications mentioned. He currently steers the Warlord Loop, an e-mail net whose 150 heavy hitters ventilate crucial national security issues from every quadrant of the compass.

MR Book Reviews

Featured Review

AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, Francis Fukuyama, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2006, 226 pages, $25.00.

Francis Fukuyama, celebrated author of *The End of History and the Last Man* (Harper Perennial, New York, 1993), has finally confessed to what the rest of us have suspected: History goes on, with a vengeance. In his latest book Fukuyama provides personal views on the role America should play in what used to be called the "New World Order," which is now not only the post-Cold War world, but also the post-9/11 world.

Fukuyama describes the influence of neoconservative thought on President George W. Bush's foreign policy. In doing so, he provides a short, personal history of the neoconservative movement and its ideas. Fukuyama speaks as an insider: His account is based on years of personal friendships and close professional association with leading figures of the neoconservative movement, including Paul Wolfowitz, Albert Wohlstetter, and Allan Bloom. He delivers some surprising news: Neoconservatives are not new; the movement arose in the early 1940s and provided an alternative to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his "realists" during the latter stages of the Cold War.

Neoconservatives remain firm believers in "liberal" democracy—indeed, the founders of the movement started their careers with decidedly leftist preferences. Neoconservatives are not truly conservative in their foreign policy designs; in stark contrast to other conservative movements that profess restraint in foreign policy in the name of strict national interest, stability, or isolationism, they are distinct activists who believe in promoting democracy and free markets.

Fukuyama wrote his book because he felt his views were no longer compatible with Bush's neoconservative policies. Rather than reclaiming the term and returning it to what he believes is its original meaning, Fukuyama has conceded the neoconservative appellation to its current practitioners in the administration. Cynical readers might interpret Fukuyama's change of mind as a case of sour grapes in response to the dramatic fall from grace of Bush's foreign policy agenda and, in particular, the war in Iraq. However, Fukuyama is a serious scholar and provides a finely nuanced, articulate critique of what he perceives to be the failures of current policy and the misinterpretation of the original neoconservative foreign policy paradigm.

Fukuyama describes the neoconservative foreign policy agenda as one "involving concepts like regime change, benevolent hegemony, unipolarity, preemption, and American exceptionalism." All of these, in his view, "came to be the hallmarks of the Bush administration's foreign policy." His critique of the current administration is threefold. First, he believes the administration mischaracterized the threat to the United States from radical Islamism by wrongly conflating it with the threat from failed and rogue states (for example in the alleged Al Qaeda-Iraq connection). This belief led to the policy of "preventive war" and the Iraq War. Second, he claims that the administration grossly miscalculated, and then dismissed, the negative effect unilateral action would have on world opinion; most significantly, on the reaction of some of our closest traditional allies. The third, and perhaps the most serious criticism, is directed at the administration's failure to plan for and consider the difficulties of the occupation and the transition of Iraq from a totalitarian dictatorship to a multiparty, multiethnic, secular democratic state.

According to Fukuyama, "Bush's ex-post facto effort to justify a preventive war in idealistic terms has led many critics to simply desire the opposite of whatever he wants." In other words, the President has maneuvered himself into a lame duck posture early in his second term by adopting an activist and muscular open-ended foreign policy that has moved precisely in the opposite direction of his traditional conservative stance, a stance that specifically frowned on the use of the armed forces for nation-building.

Most of these criticisms will be familiar to serving military officers and others working in foreign policy

and related fields. But Fukuyama presents his points in the context of the neoconservative agenda within the Bush administration, one that began with the desire to use American power without conventional internationalist restraints and which, when faced with unforeseen and intractable problems, decided to justify its decisions on idealistic grounds that were far removed from its initial motives. Fukuyama is not a conspiracy theorist. He does not ascribe devious motives to the administration's strategic failures but rather points to wrong policy choices and "prudential errors"—errors of judgment fostered by a specific world view.

Fukuyama offers his own prescription for future American foreign policy, cautiously advocating an activist foreign policy that he calls "realistic Wilsonianism." This is an attempt to marry President Woodrow Wilson's American exceptionalist idealism and reliance on international institutions with a more realistic view of the world that addresses the current world situation and the limits of transnational solutions. Specifically, Fukuyama advocates dropping the much vaunted Global War on Terrorism moniker for more precise terms such as counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and anti-jihadist campaigns leveraging all elements of national power in other regions of the globe.

Fukuyama differs from the realist position that sees states as autonomous entities driven by self-interest. He acknowledges that promoting democracy may be a worthy foreign policy goal for the United States, but cautions that successful cases of transition to democracy share three characteristics: First the initiative must come from within the society in question; second, success only occurs in what he calls "semi-permissive regimes," which for their own purposes allow the existence of at least token opposition and an electoral process in which democracy may express itself; and last, societies must be receptive to the ideas advocated by Western democracies and the free market system to leverage their moral and material assistance in their own transition to democracy. Fukuyama also advocates the use of "soft power"; that is, diplomacy, economic policies, persuasion, information, and even the armed forces in support of other elements of national power as the preferred method to achieve America's goals while minimizing international antagonism.

America at the Crossroads is a tightly woven, highly personal, and articulate critique of Bush's foreign policy agenda and its connection with neoconservative thought. As most academic theorists do, Fukuyama highlights the painful gulf that exists between worthy ideals and their practical implementation. This is especially true in the rough-and-tumble world of politics. The question that inevitably comes to mind is: Why, if Fukuyama can be so articulate in describing a more measured course for U.S. foreign policy, did he wait to write the book until the events in Iraq and the consequent international reaction have discredited the administration's policy at home and abroad? Was his distancing from the neoconservatives a belated act of self-preservation? Or did it spring from an academic's natural reluctance to jump to premature conclusions? Whatever the underlying motivation might have been, Fukuyama's book is definitely worth reading for all military and security professionals—with a pinch of critical salt.

MAJ Prisco R. Hernández, USA, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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ON POINT, Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2005, 539 pages, $34.95. **BASRAH, BAGHDAD, AND BEYOND: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War,** Nicholas E. Reynolds, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2005, 276 pages, $32.95.

Our nation's involvement in Iraq is far from over. Even how future generations will refer to the conflict is still undetermined—a second Iraq War or Persian Gulf War II? Early histories have offered several accounts of unit actions, specific events, individual experiences, or attempts at synthesis. Those interested in studying the conflict now have two service-sponsored efforts regarding the first months of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): the Army's *On Point,* by Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, and the Marines' *Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond,* by Nicholas Reynolds.

On Point covers the actions and decisions at every level of war, effectively relating the experiences of general officers but always returning to those who do the hard work at the sharp end. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn's analysis embraces the many joint, combined arms, and branch operations that together comprise modern warfare. Despite the authors admitting that they could not give every tactical action its due, this is an effective rendering of the events leading up to and encompassing the combat action during March and April 2003. Individual units—combat, combat support, and combat service support—receive deserved recognition. Fontenot and his colleagues relate soldiers' stories through a text that skillfully melds these many parts into a consistently coherent and readable account.

Individual vignettes range from descriptions of close combat to the irony of the 3d Infantry Division's Colonel Daniel Allyn declaring, "If I had tried this attack at the NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California], I would not survive the after-action review," and the dark humor of realizing that the first Iraqi soldier killed during OIF might have met his fate when he was struck by an aerial-delivered box of psychological operations pamphlets. (Notably, a U.S. Air Force MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft dropped that box, making it a joint operation.)

No less impressive is the chapter titled "Implications," in which the authors offer frank, hardnosed analysis to add to *On Point's* value. They note that "Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines study history not to glorify past campaigns [well, maybe a little], but rather to prepare for future campaigns," then proceed to offer insights to assist in that preparation. Doctrinal shortfalls, equipment deficiencies (and related Soldier workarounds), and insufficient urban training capabilities are among many areas sharply yet professionally scrutinized in a manner reflecting not only on the authors, but also on the powers that be who allowed such open review in the interest of preparing for the conflicts that are sure to come. (The authors, by the way, also deserve the readers' thanks for holding the line against the growing and needless aggrandizement of the military via capitalization of "joint," "soldier," "marine," "service," and similar words.)

I do not mean to imply that *On Point* provides the ultimate recitation of the war's events. While the book is commendable in its consideration of joint matters, there is still much to be written of other services, Coalition partners, individuals, and units. Analyses of commanders' decisions and personal interactions, too, have by and large been left to others—a perhaps unsurprising fact despite the admirable openness allowed. Additional well-considered analysis, especially regarding events in Iraq since the spring of 2003, will further benefit the thinking professionals. Yet the most unfortunate aspect of *On Point* lies with the publishers: The quality of the maps and other images is disappointing.

Nicholas Reynolds's *Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond* is much shorter than *On Point* and is not what one might expect from the subtitle. Reynolds's focus is the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). (Forthcoming histories covering aviation, combat service support, Task Force Tarawa in Iraq, and Marine operations in Afghanistan are promised, works that should expand on the material offered in this initial publication.)

Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond is an overly headquarters-centric offering, one that relies too much on commercial media sources rather than on primary sources for facts and analysis. Firsthand retellings and considered examination of actions where the Marines meet the enemy are few and lacking in depth. Historians will appreciate Reynolds's coverage of operations in northern and southeastern Iraq, but here, too, descriptions of the commands' relationships and headquarters' living conditions smother the few sorties into exploits at the cold face.

Reynolds's assessment of key commanders' precombat speeches to their Marines and Soldiers offers insights into personalities. He identifies incidents of interservice rivalries that threatened and impeded combat effectiveness, thereby offering insights that cannot fail to disgust any who have had to deal with their consequences. The Marine at battalion level and below is only an occasional guest in the book. There is value in a record of life in headquarters where higher echelon commanders make decisions and develop guidance. Yet offering a history of military leaders as a comprehensive account of I MEF action in the war is like assuming that a history of New York's mayors tells that city's tale of growth and glory. *Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond* is a too-sterile recounting of Marine ground actions in the war; it leaves the rifleman, squad leader, and young officer searching in vain for a real sense of what it is like to fight in Iraq.

To compare a history written so soon after the fact with the likes of Marine historian Jack Schulimson's work on Vietnam would be unfair. However, that does not preclude his fine work from serving as a benchmark to strive for. Hopefully, the U.S. Marine volumes on OIF that are yet to come will achieve a better balance between the tactical and higher levels of war and will be more representative of the full range of Marine action in the field. In the meantime, the book will serve as a summary of the conflict from a headquarters' perspective.

On Point's impressive range of interviews and other primary sources provides the depth, balance, and scope that should characterize initial service histories. In comparison, there are Marine accounts yet to come that might provide similar resources for those hungry to learn. It is encouraging that the Army and the Marines recognize the need to publish such works in a timely manner. One hopes that they and the other services will in the future also recognize that stability and support operations deserve similar attention.

Russell W. Glenn, Ph.D.,
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HERE, BULLET. Brian Turner, Alice James Books, Farmington, ME, 2005, 71 pages, $14.95.

The poets are always right: history is on their side.

—Bukharin to Stalin, 1934

Brian Turner, who holds a Master of Fine Arts degree in creative writing, served as an infantry team leader during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. *Here, Bullet* is his debut book of 46 poems representing his combat experience. The book's cover depicts the near-monochromatic geometry of a Soldier who blends into the middle ground of a desert, evoking the Cubist scheme of devastated landscape in Paul Nash's painting *We Are Making a New World* (1918).

Turner probes the immense pathos of Iraq at war: "You hear the RPG [rocket propelled grenade] coming for you. / Not so the roadside bomb." Throughout, he forces us to face the terror: "Believe it when a twelve-year old / rolls a grenade into the room." Elsewhere a dying Soldier has "just enough blood / to cough up and drown in," and a civil affairs officer stares at his missing hands. In "Autopsy," a dead Soldier's heart is weighed by a mortuary affairs specialist who wonders how fast that heart once beat on the occasion of the Soldier's first kiss. Turner revisits some terrible paradoxes as in "The Al Harishma Weapons Market," where "an American death puts food on the table, / more cash than most men earn in an entire year." Still, in "Sadiq," "no matter what adrenaline / feeds the muscle its courage, / . . . it should break your heart to kill."

Turner draws deep affinities with history and his thematic vision is broad. In "Hwy 1," he reminds us that the invasion of Iraq was incipient in "the Highway of Death" of the first Gulf War, and even more anciently, along "/ . . . the spice road of old." In "In the Leupold Scope," a Soldier scans the horizon for enemy positions, only to behold an Iraqi woman hanging laundry, knowing that she is one of many "women with breasts swollen with milk" who is essentially ". . .dressing the dead, clothing them / as they wait in silence." There is a particularly telling image in "The Baghdad Zoo," where an escaped baboon wanders the desert "confused / by the wind, the blowing sands of the barchan dunes," a distantly hominoid metonymy of modern man's endless reversion to primal violence. Turner reminds us that there are brief moments of respite, as when a Soldier—for once, "didn't comfort an injured man / who cupped pieces of his friend's brain / in his hands; instead, today, / white birds rose from the Tigris."

The inscription of Turner's experience as poetry is valuable, and readers are fortunate for what is likely the first printed volume of poetry to come out of the war. Yet overall, there are not many artistically memorable verses and little

expression of the dynamic capabilities of language that could have undergirded a rich poetic imagery. The best poems are "A Soldier's Arabic" and "Here, Bullet,"—both peering into the poet's psyche; "Easel," "Sadiq," and "To Sand." Still, *Here, Bullet* is a poignant and brutally lucid evocation of war.

MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF, Ramstein Air Base, Germany

CHILDREN AT WAR, P.W. Singer, Pantheon Books, New York, 2005, 304 pages, $25.00.

In his most recent work, P.W. Singer tackles an emerging aspect of the modern battlefield to which political and military leaders must respond: child soldiers. Singer, a Fellow at the Brookings Institution, observes that the use of children in combat is "global in scope and massive in number." He maintains that the practice has become so pervasive that it requires "an entirely new doctrine of warfare" with an unwritten "new body of fundamental principles, deliberate instrumental choices, and transferred teachings about how to fight."

Singer's description of the methods of systematic recruitment, abduction, and deception (including forced drug addiction) used to manipulate children into participating in military operations is chilling, yet instructive. So are the implications, which include more prolonged, more brutal conflicts that defy resolution. Singer suggests that the actions of the international community may be crucial to ending the practice. Political leaders must universally condemn the practice and support organizational and institutional efforts to improve the awful economic conditions that give rise to the practice. In addition, Singer recommends using the World Court or war crimes tribunals to punish leaders who encourage and coerce children to fight.

Although the threat of punishment may deter the employment of child soldiers, it likely will not end it. Therefore, those forces that might face children on the battlefield must have sound doctrine and be trained for the eventuality. Singer notes that only the Marine Corps (in exercises at Marine Corps University) has included child soldiers in training scenarios, and he derides other service branches for their lack of attention to the problem. Singer also argues that political leaders, too, need to address the issue. For example, when crafting the terms of future peace agreements, they must be mindful to include plans for the demobilization, counseling, and education of former child soldiers.

Singer's book is unsettling but essential reading for military and political leaders who may face children at war. Strengths of the work include a frank description of the problem, its implications, proposed responses from the international community, and a recommendation that future peace agreements include demobilization provisions. The book's chief weaknesses derive from a superficial and sometimes formulaic treatment of the causes of the practice. For example, to place primary blame on U.S. policies or current economic conditions ignores the historical nature of unresolved conflict in many regions; fails to address ethnic, cultural, and religious factors; and does not acknowledge the influence of longstanding unresolved political or social issues.

In the end, Singer stresses the strategic nature of the problem and observes that there is no panacea. Thus, U.S. Soldiers must prepare to face children in military operations. Moreover, nations that send armies to areas in which children are in combat must be ready to counter demoralizing and damaging effects on their troops. As political and military leaders continue to probe the new dimensions of warfare, effective doctrinal development must begin with the study of these unsavory practices.

Deborah C. Kidwell, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

SURPRISE ATTACK: The Victim's Perspective, Ephraim Kam, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004, 266 pages, $18.95.

Ephraim Kam's *Surprise Attack* offers a meticulously researched analysis of indications and warnings (I&W) intelligence. I&W is a multidisciplined field that draws data from all branches of intelligence collection as well as political science, psychology, and even game theory. I&W's mission is to warn policymakers of imminent invasion or pending military action by foreign powers.

Kam explains that because I&W is so complex, surprise attacks were relatively common during World War II. He cites standard analytical problems as the causes of warning failure: poor vetting of sources, cognitive biases, and over-compartmentalization of intelligence. Case studies, from the German invasion of Norway to Chinese incursions into India and Vietnam, support his conclusions. He also draws from psychology, political science, history, and intelligence analysis to make his case.

Kam concludes that surprise attacks are inevitable because successful warnings rely on many processes operating correctly; thus, surprise can occur when even one alarm fails or when analysts ignore an alarm that goes off too often. He offers suggestions to improve I&W, such as cultivating mature, insightful analysts who display competence, courage, and candor. *Surprise Attack* will interest students in the intelligence field and those who are in the policymaking process. The book is detailed enough to be a textbook for any serious course and should not be considered light reading.

CPT Andrew Marvin, US Army Military Intelligence, Iraq

THE BATTLE OF AN LOC, James H. Willbanks, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2005, 226 pages, $29.95.

The Battle of An Loc is a well-researched and solid history of one of the pivotal South Vietnamese and American battlefield victories during the 1972 Easter Offensive. The book is particularly topical because it examines a battle in which the combination of embedded American advisers, American air power, and indigenous Vietnamese forces were effective in defeating numerically superior North Vietnamese formations. James H. Willbanks is uniquely qualified to write such a book—he was among the American advisers at An Loc, he holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Kansas, and he is on the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Because the South Vietnamese won this battle at a time when the Vietnamization process was nearly

complete and because there were by then only two reinforced American combat brigades and 5,416 American advisers in the whole of Vietnam, this book may be germane to U.S. and Coalition efforts to train indigenous forces and to reduce the number of U.S. forces fighting insurgents in Iraq.

The Battle of An Loc begins with the strategic context, then scopes down to the enemy and friendly operational-level dispositions, and finally focuses on the battle, its lessons, and its aftermath. Willbanks explains the command and control architecture of the U.S. advisory effort and the array of indigenous South Vietnamese forces in 1972. He observes that when North Vietnam decided to launch large-scale massed conventional attacks during the 1972 campaign, "they made a major miscalculation when they failed to anticipate how much air power they would have to contend with." At the tactical level, Willbanks attributes the outcome of the battle partly to North Vietnam's poor decision to use tanks as infantry support and to their squandering their great numerical advantage through the repeated use of suicidal frontal attacks that were not well coordinated with the tank forces.

The bottom line to the history of this battle, as well as to the Battle of Kontum during the same Easter Offensive, is that the South Vietnamese Government and armed forces might have ultimately prevailed against the North if the United States had continued to provide advisers and air support. Willbanks also notes that the performance of the South Vietnamese forces at An Loc was mixed. For example, while the South Vietnamese Territorial Forces, airborne brigade, and Rangers fought with skill and courage, the soldiers of the 5th ARVN Division acquitted themselves poorly. Fortunately, the embedded U.S. advisers and the firepower that they were able to coordinate in the form of attack helicopters, AC-130 Specter close air support, and some 700 B-52 arclight sorties provided the winning advantage. *The Battle of An Loc* is commendable and relevant to the military audience as one account of the successful use of regular and auxiliary local forces with U.S. advisers and air power.

LTC Robert M. Cassidy, USA, Kuwait

FORGING THE SHIELD: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century, Dennis E. Showalter, ed., Imprint Publications, Chicago, IL, 2005, 226 pages, $24.95.

Forging the Shield is a collection of essays prepared by various speakers at a special symposium co-sponsored by the Eisenhower Memorial Commission and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University, on the career and influence of former U.S. President Dwight David Eisenhower. Eisenhower, who graduated from the Army Industrial College in 1932 and later served on the faculty, was instrumental in the formation of the National Defense University while he served as the Army Chief of Staff after World War II.

The book begins with an essay by Sergei Khrushchev that gives us a first-hand perspective of Soviet society; his father, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev; and his father's experiences with Eisenhower. Subsequent essayists review various aspects of Eisenhower's national security structure, processes, and products, offering insightful perspectives on Eisenhower's foreign policy initiatives, especially with regard to the Korean War and China.

The essayists comment on Eisenhower's overall defense strategy, showing it to have been a balanced and fiscally prudent program, and they discuss Eisenhower's expansion of U.S. intelligence capabilities—an energized CIA whose director enjoyed unparalleled access to the president; communications intelligence (National Security Agency, 1952); and overhead reconnaissance (airborne overflights of the Soviet Union, the U-2 program, and Corona). One essay describes Eisenhower's reluctant role in creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, showing how he braked what could have been unnecessary government bureaucracy and expense in the wake of post-Sputnik hysteria. The final essayist discusses Eisenhower's support for joint professional education. An appendix contains the roundtable panel discussion that concluded the symposium.

These essays offer a balanced, insightful review of Eisenhower's contribution to U.S. national security. Reviewing this book was a pleasure. I was privileged to have attended the symposium, which I found to be a professionally rewarding experience.

LTC Christopher E. Bailey, USA, Charlottesville, Virginia

LAST OF THE COLD WAR SPIES, Roland Perry, Da Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005, 395 pages, $27.50.

Roland Perry has provided an immensely readable and well-researched biography of Michael Straight, the only American in Britain's Cambridge spy ring. Born into a wealthy New England family, Straight went to Cambridge University in the 1930s, where he fell in with a notorious circle of friends who were already working for Soviet Intelligence: Guy Burgess, Don Maclean, Anthony Blunt, and Kim Philby. For 40 years, while he worked in the State Department, ran *The New Republic* magazine, and worked for Presidents John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon, Straight was also a KGB agent.

In 1963, Straight falsely confessed to the FBI, claiming that his involvement in KGB covert activities had ended in 1942. Perry sorts through the fact and fiction of Straight's life, drawing on archival material from U.S. and former Soviet sources and on interviews with former CIA and KGB agents. Perry's biography is the first complete portrait of Straight's life.

He provides intriguing insights and anecdotes drawn from Straight's intelligence career, among them:

- No agent could stray from the course once recruited—the KGB had a direct, permanent means of decommissioning agents.
- The 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact posed problems for KGB agents: How could a control officer explain Stalin's move to an ideologically committed agent who was opposed to fascism?
- Straight's allegations against FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover led to increased surveillance of Straight's activities.
- Straight used his connection to Nixon, an arch anti-Communist, to secure a position on the National Endowment for the Arts, where he promoted liberal, anti-administration themes.

Altogether, Perry has created an accessible, well-researched portrait of a generally unknown member of

the Cambridge spy ring. I recommend this book to persons interested in intelligence history.

LTC Christopher E. Bailey, USA, Charlottesville, Virginia

STALIN'S LAST WAR: Korea and the Approach to World War III, Alan J. Levine, McFarland & Co., Jefferson, NC, 2005, 320 pages, $39.95.

Histories of the Korean War often depict North Korea as underestimating the United States' willingness to defend South Korea, and the United States' refusal to believe China when it warned against invading North Korea. Although both sides undoubtedly made such errors, any account that emphasizes these misunderstandings tends to take the war out of its larger context; that is, the worldwide rivalry of the early Cold War. Regardless, at the time, both sides viewed the war through the distorted prism of mutual suspicions and fears.

Alan Levine restores that wider context in *Stalin's Last War: Korea and the Approach to World War III,* in which he views the strategic direction of the war through the eyes of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and both Korean governments. U.S. President Harry S. Truman, for example, regarded Korea as a deliberate Communist distraction from the defense of Europe.

Levine ties many divergent threads into his narrative, yet his underlying theme is quite controversial: He asserts that between 1951 and 1952 Stalin deliberately planned to conquer Western Europe before the United States could complete its rearmament program. He backs this theory with a single statement made 26 years after the event by Czech Defense Minister Alexej Cepicka, who claimed that in 1951 Stalin told him and other satellite leaders to prepare for such a war. To buttress this claim, Levine reviewed other events, including the 1950 statements of Italian Communist officials who feared that a war was approaching. Levine argues that these events make sense only if viewed as part of Stalin's war preparations.

Levine makes a plausible argument for this controversial interpretation even though in 1951 the Soviet Union was still recovering from the catastrophic effects of World War II and was unprepared for such a risky effort. In fact, many of the events Levine cites to support his thesis could also be interpreted as evidence that Stalin, like the West, feared that the Korean War would unintentionally spiral into World War III. Viewed in this manner, Levine's thesis must be considered unproven, although the specter of a wider war can help the reader comprehend why so many world leaders struggled to put limits on the Korean War.

This book is a refreshing reexamination of a perennial topic and as such is well worth the reader's time.

COL Jonathan M. House, USAR, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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LOUIS JOHNSON AND THE ARMING OF AMERICA: The Roosevelt and Truman Years, Keith D. McFarland and David L. Roll, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 452 pages, $35.00.

Keith McFarland and David Roll have written a first-class biography of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, who was in office from January 1948 to September 1950. This extremely insightful, well written, meticulously researched, and eminently fair book is particularly needed because critics' opinions have clouded Johnson's picture.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson characterized Johnson as suffering a brain disorder that caused hyperaggression. President Harry S. Truman concluded that Johnson "is the most ego maniac [man] I've ever come in contact with—and I've seen a lot." Truman might simply have gotten a bit more than he wanted. He had appointed Johnson to the position because Johnson's predecessor, James Forrestal, seemed too deferential to the armed services.

Coming from modest roots in West Virginia, Johnson became a self-made multimillionaire who was ambitious, abrasive, hard-working, and effective. In 1949, he set out to hold military spending to $13 billion a year (about 5 percent of the gross domestic product). The military wanted $15 billion but could not ply Johnson's firm hand off their budget until the Korean War. Why Johnson took the stance he did is a point of controversy because he had been a strong proponent of preparedness when he was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Assistant Secretary of War. McFarland and Roll conclude that Johnson was "driven by politics, power, and personal ambition but rarely by principle."

Johnson wanted to be secretary of defense and Truman wanted the federal budget balanced. Johnson was doing Truman's bidding, but became a political liability when the administration's policy shortcomings were exposed during the Korean War. The public wanted to hold someone accountable for the crisis, and Johnson became a scapegoat. His ambitions might have led him to the presidency if not for North Korea's invasion of South Korea, a place America had not planned to defend. Truman changed his policy, committed ground troops, and dismissed his secretary of defense.

Acheson was as unpopular as Johnson, but Truman stuck by him at a substantial political cost. Johnson, not satisfied with running the armed services, had tried to take foreign policy for China and Taiwan out of Acheson's hands. In Truman's mind, Johnson had become a critic, thus enabling Truman to justify dismissing the man who had done difficult duties on his behalf. Many books describe Truman's military policies. I know none better nor any as interesting as this study of the life and times of Johnson.

Michael Pearlman, Ph.D., Lawrence, Kansas

IF BRITAIN HAD FALLEN: The Real Nazi Occupation Plans, Norman Longmate, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2004, 304 pages, $19.95.

In describing Norman Longmate's book, words like "counterfactual" and "what-if history" readily come to mind. However, *If Britain Had Fallen* transcends these simplistic descriptions when it asks: What if Britain had been defeated and occupied by Nazi German forces? The book's approach is greater than simply posing this question and making up a story to go along with it. Longmate ostensibly uses archival evidence to create a background for the invasion and subsequent occupation of Britain.

The only real problem with the book is that Longmate does not use notes and offers only a few comments on bibliographic sources. He

refers to various Nazi war plans, but does not cite them or mention any of the works that he consulted. Overall, the book is entertaining and probably could have value to the defense community because of its analysis of invasion and occupation operations (even though the book's examples are primarily conjectural). The book has most value for World War II buffs.
David Schepp, Fort Benning, Georgia

BRIDGE AT REMAGAN: 27th Armoured Infantry Division, Andrew Rawson, Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., Bansley, England, 2004, 192 pages, $16.95.

Andrew Rawson's *Bridge at Remagen,* one of the latest in Pen and Sword Books' Battleground Europe series provides tactical narratives of military operations designed to aid travelers. Rawson's book is an excellent narration of the first tactical crossing of the Rhine River in March 1945, as Allied armies were preparing for their final drive on Hitler's Third Reich. The story primarily concerns the companies and battalions of Combat Command B of the U.S. 9th Armoured Division.

Rawson's book is concise enough not to daunt the reader and contains enough photographs and good maps (many showing specific unit movement routes) to permit the reader to visualize and comprehend the battlefield. Rawson is better than most at incorporating opposing German activities into the text, thereby not restricting the reader to a single perspective.

The fight for the Remagen bridgehead was limited geographically making it possible for a traveler to explore and fully appreciate the scene of the battle during the course of a weekend. Rawson's commentary, maps, and guidance go a long way toward providing the reader with a sense of how the mission progressed.
LTC Michael A. Boden, USA, Hohenfels, Germany

ALASKA'S HIDDEN WARS: Secret Campaigns on the North Pacific Rim, Otis Hays, Jr., University of Alaska Press, Fairbanks, 2004, 174 pages, $19.95.

Early in World War II, the isles of the North Pacific Rim were seen by both the Japanese and the United States as key strategic footholds between Asia and North America. Each side feared an island-hopping invasion that could be launched in either direction via the Aleutians. The Americans quickly realized the importance of intelligence outposts in the region and set up a security perimeter to monitor activity. The Japanese set up positions to defend against potential American attacks.

Although combat in the Aleutians would be limited to the early stages of the war, the United States maintained a facade of activity in the region by moving troops, changing security plans, and launching occasional aerial attacks into Japanese territory. Duty was monotonous for U.S. forces on the ground, but the illusion was convincing to the Japanese. It also kept Japanese forces occupied while U.S. forces moved toward the Japanese mainland from the south.

In *Alaska's Hidden Wars: Secret Campaigns on the North Pacific Rim*, Otis Hays, Jr., tells the story of the North Pacific campaign from several perspectives. He illuminates the experiences of aviation crews who conducted deceptive attacks and braved the freezing, unforgiving seas only to be ignored as attention, opportunities, and rewards went to their colleagues in other theaters. Hays conveys the tedious banality of the war as experienced by Soldiers, officers, and civilians on the ground, entrenched in a progressively wearisome waiting game. He explains the strategic importance of the maritime supply routes between North America and the Soviet Union, and details the crucial yet often understated contribution of Japanese-American intelligence personnel, the *Nisei*. Drawing on declassified signals intelligence and Japanese news broadcasts, he also provides a glimpse of the campaign as the Japanese saw it.

Alaska's Hidden Wars uses an impressive collection of primary sources to tell its story, including a roster of Japanese-American translators, samples of American propaganda leaflets dropped in Japan, a translation of the famous diary of Japanese doctor Paul Tatsuguchi, and an overview of signals intelligence operations in the region. The book offers a concise, well-rounded history that puts a human face on a war in a time when the elements were as formidable as the enemy himself.
Kevin Freese, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

GIVEN UP FOR DEAD: American GI's in the Nazi Concentration Camp at Berga, Flint Whitlock, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 2005, 283 pages, $26.00.

Flint Whitlock presents a wrenching account of the treatment of American prisoners of war (POWs) during World War II using the words of the veterans who survived the ordeal. He begins the story with the POW's backgrounds—Americans from Texas to New York. These were average Americans—volunteers and draftees, fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons. Whitlock tells of the Soldiers' training and deployment to the front lines just before the Battle of the Bulge to give a sense of the Soldiers' lack of battlefield experience.

Whitlock's skill in blending the Soldiers' personal accounts with vivid descriptions of the locations pulls the reader into the POW's experiences. Even with an event that happened so many years ago, readers can still feel the horror and shock of the sheer brutality of the experience. The POWs confronted the specter of Death, resisting their tormenters in whatever way they could. During their 300-kilometer death march to the concentration camps, the Americans still found strength to carry on, even as their comrades were dying in growing numbers. The Soldiers survived because of the great courage they showed in overcoming insurmountable odds.

The book's conclusion leaves the reader with a bittersweet taste as Whitlock tells the fates of both the Soldiers who survived and the brutal guards who tortured them. Leaders today should read this book for a better understanding of how U.S. Soldiers fought and persevered and also to consider the lessons of how brutal men can be to their fellow man.
MAJ David C. Snow, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE CONFEDERATE DIRTY WAR: Arson, Bombings, Assassination, and Plots for Chemical and Germ Attacks on the Union, Jane Singer, McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, NC, 2005, 174 pages, $35.00.

An intriguing exploration into unconventional warfare during the U.S. Civil War, Jane Singer's *The Confederate Dirty War* offers insights and cautions for current operations in the Iraqi theater. As described by Singer, the diligent efforts of Confederate operatives to undermine the authority of the U.S. Government seem to have presaged the complex and ambiguous nature of contemporary guerrilla warfare.

Singer focuses her study on clandestine agents and the operations they conducted against the cities of the North and a government that so many in the South despised. She does not speculate about or judge the characters in question, but skillfully and rather succinctly provides an accurate historical record of the facts and lets those facts speak for themselves.

The book details how elements within the Confederacy, acting officially or otherwise, developed and attempted numerous plans to inflict terror and death on the Union populace and bring down the government. Singer introduces the reader to such shadowy characters as Professor Richard Sears McCulloch, who resigned a faculty chair at Columbia College to assist the Confederacy in making a chemical weapon; Luke Pryor Blackburn, a physician and, later, governor of Kentucky, who allegedly spread smallpox and yellow fever throughout the North; and Felix Grundy Stidger, a government secret service agent and counterspy, who infiltrated the highest ranks of the Sons of Liberty, a clandestine Confederate organization.

Singer also offers a new perspective on John Wilkes Booth's role in the conspiracy to assassinate President Abraham Lincoln. She shows how Civil War operatives, not unlike contemporary insurgents, often act on their own initiative with minimal guidance from higher leaders.

The Confederate Dirty War is rich in illustrations, photographs, and notes, and it extensively cites other valuable Civil War references. Weaving her sources together skillfully, Singer provides a coherent assessment of the Confederacy's untiring efforts to demoralize the North and decapitate its government. Singer also illustrates the extreme measures desperate people go to in pursuit of their ideological and political ambitions. As she connects the past and present via the historical framework of asymmetrical warfare, Singer offers a somber reflection on the likelihood of U.S. success in combating the insurgency in Iraq.

LTC Jonathan M. Williams, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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CIVIL WAR ON THE MISSOURI-KANSAS BORDER, Donald L. Gilmore, Pelican Press, Gretna, LA, 2006, 376 pages, $29.95.

Donald L. Gilmore has written a vivid, enlightening account of events along the Kansas/Missouri border from 1854 to 1865. He discusses the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Compromises of 1820 and 1850, and other problems that led to the border conflict. This was a time that challenged men's souls as they experienced life and death in "Bloody Kansas" and in western Missouri's "Burnt District," and Gilmore describes it well.

Gilmore breaks new ground by offering a version of the border war from mostly the Missouri point of view. In doing so, he provides an in-depth study of why good men do bad things. The book highlights infamous Kansans such as John Brown, James Montgomery, Daniel Anthony (brother of Susan B. Anthony), James Lane, Charles Jennison, and the "Red Legs" whose solutions to problems were to terrorize, murder, pillage, and burn (a practice otherwise known as jayhawking). Many of the Red Legs' actions (not unlike the exploits of Genghis Khan and Attila the Hun) would be considered war crimes today.

The book discusses law-of-war violations in Missouri, such as scalpings, the severing of extremities, executions of prisoners of war, illegal use of civilians on the battlefield, robberies, the burning of homes and businesses, and the round-up and confinement of insurgent families. According to Gilmore, these events help explain why William "Bill" Quantrill transitioned from a school teacher to a bushwhacker, and how he overcame his moral scruples to raid Olathe, Paola, and Lawrence—the latter resulting in the massacre of every townsman from 16 to 60.

Quantrill wasn't the worst of the lot: Many of his men considered his actions insufficient to stop the Union plague in Missouri and took it upon themselves to fix the problem. One Quantrill apostate, "Bloody Bill" Anderson, earned his nickname in 1864 by wiping out a 115-man Union force and by massacring 24 unarmed Union soldiers during a train robbery. Anderson's father had been killed by abolitionists, and in 1863 some of Anderson's sisters were killed and the others maimed in a make-shift Union prison. He was already a killer, but these events made Anderson psychotic. Frank and Jesse James, who were part of Anderson's party, learned devious lessons from him for their postwar careers as bandits.

Gilmore also provides insights into insurgency and counterinsurgency operations before and during the Civil War. The book discusses the tactics, techniques, and procedures of seasoned Civil War insurgents, the experiences they had and the lessons they learned during the first 2 years of the war, and how they developed into seasoned, hard-edged raiders.

In sum, *Civil War on the Missouri-Kansas Border* is a captivating account of western life during the violent years prior to and during the Civil War. A thorough, well-researched study of the realities of life during a particularly volatile time, it should appeal to scholars and laymen alike.

MAJ Jeffrey Wingo, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MR Letters

Great Captains of Chaos

Colonel James K. Greer, *Chief of Staff, MNSTC-I, Baghdad*—I would like to offer the following comments about Major F. John Burpo's superb January-February 2006 article "The Great Captains of Chaos: Developing Adaptive Leaders." Burpo makes some great observations in detailing the leadership traits required of adaptive leaders. I would only add that the base trait of an adaptive leader is excellence in the tactics and techniques of our profession. That mastery is the basis for effective adaptation.

Fortunately, the initiation of Basic Officer Learning Course (BOLC) II will begin the solid grounding in the basic skills our profession requires for successful adaptation. Second, his observation about Ranger School is right on—it is a tremendous school for developing adaptive leaders and the more people we get through there the better. There are no branches, MOS's, or organizations in our 21st-century Army that don't require the small-unit leadership skills developed at Ranger School.

The two educational experiences that most shaped my ability to adapt were Ranger School and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). By their very nature, both courses require the student to adapt to succeed, over and over again on a daily basis. One course is primarily tactics in the field, the other is operational art; but both succeed at developing adaptive leaders. I disagree with Burpo about skipping the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) to go straight to SAMS. Any SAMS graduate or instructor will confirm that ILE is a vital component of the SAMS education. It provides the grounding in doctrine, the military decisionmaking process, and joint/combined operations that is necessary to build a common basis of expertise from which to launch the SAMS curriculum. Again, this is a great article and has some very valid recommendations that we must think through deliberately as we shape adaptive leader development for the future.

Laurels from *AFJ*

Thomas Donnelly, Editor, *Armed Forces Journal (AFJ)*—Laurels to the editors of *Military Review*—which, if *AFJ* weren't so broad-minded we might regard as a competitor—puts the lie to the accusation that military professional journals are simply house organs and idea-averse. *Military Review* has run a number of highly controversial critiques of the Army's performance in the Iraq counterinsurgency, including the now-infamous piece by British Brigadier Nigel R.F. Aylwin-Foster—you couldn't make up a name like that ("Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," November-December 2005). The January-February 2006 edition had a wonderful article on "The Great Captains of Chaos: Developing Adaptive Leaders" by Major F. John Burpo. The September-October 2005 issue had a very insightful piece on Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez as a master asymmetrical strategist ("The New Master of Wizard's Chess: The Real Hugo Chavez and Asymmetric Warfare" by Colonel Max G. Manwaring). [That's] out-of-the-box thinking from deep inside the Army box.

Correction

In Brigadier General Volney J. Warner and Lieutenant Colonel James H. Willbanks's January-February 2006 article "Preparing Field Grade Leaders for Today and Tomorrow," the link in footnote 9 should read <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/learning_to_adapt.pdf>.